Benjamin R. Curtis: Maverick Lawyer and Independent Jurist by Williams, Frank J. & Bader, William D., Esq.
Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 17 | Issue 2 Article 2
Spring 2012
Benjamin R. Curtis: Maverick Lawyer and
Independent Jurist
Frank J. Williams
The Lincoln Forum
William D. Bader Esq.
Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Roger Williams University
Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Williams, Frank J. and Bader, William D. Esq. (2012) "Benjamin R. Curtis: Maverick Lawyer and Independent Jurist ," Roger Williams
University Law Review: Vol. 17: Iss. 2, Article 2.
Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol17/iss2/2
Articles
Benjamin R. Curtis:
Maverick Lawyer and Independent
Jurist
The Honorable Frank J. Williams* and William D. Bader,
Esq.t
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Benjamin Robbins Curtis, though generally obscure,
has been held in high repute by today's legal scholars. Numerous
surveys and tests tend to show that Curtis is regarded as a great
or near-great Supreme Court justice.' His independent mind and
meticulous decisions made him one of this nation's greatest
jurists, despite the fact that he served only six terms as a justice
* Former Chief Justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court, adjunct professor
at Roger Williams University School of Law, founding chair of The Lincoln
Forum, and chair of the Rhode Island Civil War Sesquicentennial
Commission.
t: Member of the Connecticut Bar, nationally recognized lawyer and scholar,
and author of numerous articles and book chapters in the areas of
constitutional law and legal history. Attorney Bader also has co-authored
THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED EIGHT JUSTICES with Professor Roy M. Mersky and
David Davis: Lawyer, Judge, and Politician in the Age of Lincoln, 14 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 163 (2009), with the Honorable Frank J. Williams.
1. R. Owen Williams, Benjamin Curtis: Top of the List, 82 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 277, 277-78 (2007).
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of the United States Supreme Court. He was the first justice of
the Supreme Court to hold a formal law degree.
Justice Curtis's obscurity is largely due to his short tenure on
the high Court's bench 2 before resigning in 1857 on the heels of
the Supreme Court's controversial decision in Dred Scott v.
Sandford,3 which upheld the legitimacy of slavery. The reason for
his untimely resignation is unknown, although it was widely
speculated that it was due to the Dred Scott decision, which he
abhorred and believed was a result of extra-judicial
considerations. 4
II. LAW PRACTICE
Curtis was born in Watertown, Massachusetts on November
4, 1809, to Benjamin Curtis, the captain of a merchant vessel, and
his wife, Lois Robbins.5 Curtis was schooled in nearby Newton,
Massachusetts and later attended Harvard University and
Harvard Law School before becoming a Massachusetts lawyer. 6
Justice Curtis had practiced law for twenty-two years before his
appointment to the Supreme Court, having begun his career as a
country lawyer in Northfield, Massachusetts and later practicing
as a partner in the Boston law office of a distant relative, Charles
Pelham Curtis.
As a lawyer, Curtis defended slavery-or at least the interests
of slave owners-through his representation of a Bostonian
against whom a writ of habeas corpus was sought seeking the
2. For an excellent article on obscure justices, see Ken Gormley, "The
Forgotten Supreme Court Justices," 68 Albany L. Rev. 295. See also WILLIAM
D. BADER & FRANK J. WILLIAMS, UNKNOWN JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 41, 50, 55 (2011).
3. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
4. New Publications, N.Y. TIMES 10 (Oct. 19, 1879) (highlighting a two-
volume book titled A Memoir of Benjamin Robbins Curtis, LL. D. With Some
of His Professional and Miscellaneous Writings, a two-volume memoir, the
first volume of which is written by Justice Curtis's brother George Ticknor
Curtis, and the second of which is a collection of Justice Curtis' writings; both
volumes were edited by Justice Curtis's son, Benjamin R. Curtis).
5. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, 1 A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS,
LL. D. WITH SOME OF His PROFESSIONAL AND MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS 5
(Benjamin R. Curtis ed., 1879) [hereinafter A MEMOIR (VOLUME I)].
6. Id. at 26-27, 41.
7. TIMOTHY L. HALL, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY 124 (2001).
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return of a child slave named Med in the case Commonwealth v.
Aves.8 In 1836, Mary Slater of New Orleans traveled to Boston to
visit her father, Thomas Aves.9 Slater brought with her a six-
year-old girl named Med, who Slater's husband, Samuel Slater,
had purchased in 1833 and kept as a slave while in the slave-
recognizing state of Louisiana.10 During Slater's stay in Boston,
she became ill and asked her father, Aves, to care for Med until
Slater recovered and could return to Louisiana where her husband
was still residing." In the interim, the Boston Female Anti-
Slavery Society, antislavery sympathizer Levin H. Harris, and
others petitioned the Massachusetts courts for a writ of habeas
corpus against Aves for having unlawfully restrained Med's
liberty and seeking her release.12 Aves, represented by Curtis and
his law partner, Charles Pelham Curtis, responded that he was
acting as his daughter's agent and, therefore, had the right to
temporarily hold Med in Boston until her return to Louisiana.13
While it was well accepted that a slave became free when his or
her master moved him or her permanently to a free state,14 the
courts had not addressed the effect of a slave's temporary
placement in a free state. Curtis argued on behalf of his client
that a slave owner who brought a slave into the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts may restrain the slave while in that state for the
limited purpose of returning that slave to his or her domicile.' 5
Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court rejected Curtis's view and explained that although
the slave's presence in the state did not change his or her status
per se, the slave was entitled to his freedom because
Massachusetts law would not enforce restraint of the slave:
[I]f such persons have been slaves, they become free, not
so much because any alteration is made in their status, or
condition, as because there is no law which will warrant,
but there are laws, if they choose to avail themselves of
8. 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193, 193 (1836).
9. Id. at 194.
10. Id. at 193-94.
11. Id. at 194.
12. Id. at 193.
13. Id. at 194.
14. Id. at 207-08.
15. Id. at 195.
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them, which prohibit, their forcible detention or forcible
removal. 16
For this reason, the court granted the petition for writ of
habeas corpus, and ordered that Med be released into the care of a
guardian.' 7
III. JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
In 1851, at the urging of Massachusetts Senator Daniel
Webster, President Millard Fillmore appointed Curtis to the
United States Supreme Court to fill the vacancy left by Justice
Levi Woodbury's death. There was an uncanny similarity between
Curtis and his immediate predecessor, Woodbury. Both were
moderate conservatives from New England who personally
opposed slavery, favored legal positivism, and served on the
Supreme Court for approximately six years.18 Despite his short
tenure, Curtis wrote fifty-three majority opinions and dissented
thirteen times. 19 His opinions were regarded as "singularly free
from error, fallacy, ambiguity, and irrelevant matter, [and as]
models of judicial reasoning and statements . ... .20
In his first year on the high Court bench, he authored the
majority opinion in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, a closely
contested interstate commerce case that upheld the Pennsylvania
statute requiring all ships entering or leaving the port of
Philadelphia to hire a local pilot. 21  Justice Curtis's decision,
following the reasoning of Justice Woodbury's concurrence in the
License Cases,22 was the first majority opinion to recognize that
the Commerce Clause did not prohibit the state from regulating
interstate commerce altogether. The decision, which found a
middle ground between federal and local authority, was a
significant contribution to Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
The decision in Cooley was only the beginning of the
16. Id. at 217.
17. Id. at 225.
18. WILLIAM D. BADER & FRANK J. WILLIAMS, UNKNOWN JUSTICES OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 41, 50, 55 (2011).
19. Id. at 55.
20. New Publications, supra note 3.
21. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 320 (1851).
22. Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 618, 624 (1847)
(Woodbury, J. concurring).
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contributions Justice Curtis would make while on the Court. His
opinions enlarged the scope of federal admiralty jurisdiction, 23
recognized that corporations are citizens of their states of
incorporation, 24 and limited the reach of due process by upholding
the Solicitor of the Treasury's authority to collect debts without
first obtaining a court order.25
All of these decisions pale, however, in comparison to the
impact of his dissenting opinion in the infamous pro-slavery Dred
Scott v. Sandford decision. 26  Scott, an African-American slave,
had filed suit in federal court against the executor of his owner's
estate seeking freedom for himself, his wife and their two
daughters. Scott, who was represented by George Tickner Curtis,
Justice Curtis's brother, believed that his and his family's
presence and residence in certain free territories required his
emancipation.
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney delivered the opinion of the
Court, which carried concurring and dissenting opinions,
including a powerful dissent by Curtis. The majority opinion
grounded its decision on Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the
United States Constitution, which provides, in relevant part, that
"the judicial Power shall extend ... to Controversies . .. between
Citizens of different States . . . ." The Court held that Scott was
not a "citizen of a state" and, therefore, could not bring suit in
federal court. 27 The Court also held that Scott did not gain his
freedom by being transferred into a free territory of the United
States because Congress's power to make rules and regulations for
territories applied only to those territories that were recognized at
the time the Constitution was drafted.28 Therefore, the law that
made the territories free was unconstitutional.
Although Justice Curtis disapproved of slavery, he also
believed that helping free slaves and refusing comity to Southern
slave owners could lead to civil war.29 His support for the return
23. See, e.g., Steamboat New World v. King, 57 U.S. 469 (1853).
24. See, e.g., Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404 (1855).
25. See, e.g., Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,
59 U.S. 272 (1855).
26. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 564 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 404-06.
28. Id. at 406-413.
29. ROBERT AITKEN & MARILYN AITKEN, LAW MAKERS, LAW BREAKERS AND
UNCOMMON TRIALS 60 (2007).
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of runaway slaves to the South had led to his unpopularity in
Massachusetts, where his stance on slavery was widely
questioned.30 On April 9, 1855, the New York Tribune denounced
Curtis as "a slave-catching Judge, appointed to office as a reward
for his professional support given the Fugitive Slave bill."31
Curtis's dissent in Dred Scott, only two years later, came as a
surprise to his critics. Although Justice Curtis did not abandon
his position on the unpopular Fugitive Slave Law, he believed that
states could confer citizenship on African Americans. His dissent
challenged Taney and the majority, which concluded that the
Scotts, who were black, were slaves and for that reason, never
could be citizens of the United States.32 Curtis maintained that
states could confer citizenship on African Americans and that
black citizens of a state were automatically citizens of the United
States:
To what citizens the elective franchise shall be confined,
is a question to be determined by each State, in
accordance with its own views of the necessities or
expediencies of its condition. What civil rights shall be
enjoyed by its citizens, and whether all shall enjoy the
same, or how they may be gained or lost, are to be
determined in the same way. 33
Curtis noted that five states had recognized free blacks as citizens
by 1787 and concluded that under the Articles of Confederation
and the United States Constitution, United States citizenship
derived from state citizenship. According to Curtis:
Of this there can be no doubt. At the time of the
ratification of the Articles of Confederation, all free
native-born inhabitants of the States of New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and North
Carolina, though descended from African slaves, were not
only citizens of those States, but such of them as had the
other necessary qualifications possessed the franchise of
30. STUART STREICHLER, JUSTICE CURTIS IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA: AT THE
CROSSROADS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 38-39 (2005).
31. 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
546 (1922).
32. 60 U.S. at 569-583 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 583 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
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electors, on equal terms with other citizens. 34
Therefore, Curtis reasoned, Scott was a citizen, and as a citizen,
he was entitled to sue in federal courts. 35
Abraham Lincoln was among those who identified with the
principles announced in Curtis's powerful dissent. In his speech
at Springfield, Illinois later that year, Lincoln noted:
J[ustice] Curtis, in his dissenting opinion, shows that in
five of the then thirteen states, to wit, New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey and North
Carolina, free negroes were voters, and, in proportion to
their numbers, had the same part in making the
Constitution that the white people had. He shows this
with so much particularity as to leave no doubt of its
truth; and, as a sort of conclusion on that point, holds the
following language:
"The Constitution was ordained and established by the
people of the United States, through the action, in each
State, of those persons who were qualified by its laws to
act thereon in behalf of themselves and all other citizens
of the State. In some of the States, as we have seen,
colored persons were among those qualified by law to act
on the subject. These colored persons were not only
included in the body of 'the people of the United States,'
by whom the Constitution was ordained and established;
but in at least five of the States they had the power to act,
and, doubtless, did act, by their suffrages, upon the
question of its adoption."36
Lincoln explained that he could do nothing to improve on Curtis's
dissent. 37
Acutely aware of the power of the press, Curtis gave a copy of
his dissent to the press in advance of its publishing. The New
York Times later noted that "[t]hroughout the Northern States
34. Id. at 572-73 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 573, 588 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
36. Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), in
2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 403 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953),
available at http://quod.lib.umich.edull/1incoln/lincoln2/1:438.1?rgn=div2;view
=fulltext.
37. Id. at 400.
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[Curtis's dissenting] opinion was the subject of the highest praise,
which did not cease with the excitement of the times. It will
always stand as a masterpiece of judicial interpretation."3 8
Some, including Taney, accused Curtis of releasing his dissent
to the press for political and partisan purposes. To this, Curtis
responded: "[i]t is a sufficient reply for me to declare that I have
no connection whatever with any political party, and have no
political or partisan purpose in view, and no purpose whatever,
save a determination to avoid misconstruction and
misapprehension, from which I have suffered enough in times
past."39
Commenting on his brother's stance, George Curtis remarked:
when the demands of the slave interest .. . extended
beyond that stipulation, and claimed for slavery a
position which [Curtis] believed neither the Constitution
nor the system of the Union had given to it, his mind
was ... just as capable of an unbiased and impartial
examination of those demands as if he had never
contended for a Southern right, or counselled his fellow-
citizens to obey a stipulation in favor of the Southern
section of the Union.40
Curtis's dissent was heralded as a victory for slaves, but his
opinion as a whole was racially conservative. It emphasized that
citizenship under the Constitution did not equate to equal political
or civil rights.41 In Curtis's opinion, it was best left to the states
to define the rights of their citizens. 42
Only months after the decision's release, Justice Curtis
tendered his resignation. The New York Times later reported:
He was led to take this step chiefly because his salary
was too small to make that provision for his family which
he now felt it his imperative duty to secure. But he was
also influenced by the fact that that his confidence in the
Supreme Court had been greatly shaken by its course in
38. New Publications, supra note 4.
39. A MEMOIR (VOLUME I), supra note 5, at 228.
40. Id. at 151-52.
41. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 583 (1856) (Curtis, J.,
dissenting).
42. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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the Dred Scott case. Not only did he condemn the law as
expounded by the majority, but it was too evident that
the Judges had been moved by extra-judicial
considerations, a weakness which Judge Curtis could not
overlook in a judicial magistrate. 43
Curtis himself attributed his departure to a lack of "confidence in
the [C]ourt, and [a] willingness to co-operate with them, which
[were] essential to the satisfactory discharge of [his] duties as a
member of that body; and [he] d[id] not expect its condition to be
improved."4
IV. RETURN TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Justice Curtis's resignation did not end his career, however.
He returned to the practice of law, opening a law office in
Boston.45 In the early days of the Civil War, Curtis supported the
government and agreed to support President Abraham Lincoln "so
long and so far, and by all ways and means possible to a good
citizen."46 However, by the end of 1862, his criticism of Lincoln
began to mount as he believed that Lincoln had exceeded his
constitutional authority by suspending the writ of habeas corpus
and issuing the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. On
January 1, 1863, Lincoln issued the second Executive Order-
listing the states in which the Emancipation Proclamation would
apply-prompting Curtis to write: "I have seen a good many
eminent men today, ... & I have not seen one who does not say
the country is ruined & that its ruin is attributable largely to the
utter incompetence of the Prest. & to the radicals, who have
subdued him utterly."47  In a published pamphlet, Curtis
denounced Lincoln's use of the Executive Power to justify his
issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation. Curtis wrote:
It has never been doubted that the power to abolish
43. New Publications, supra note 4.
44. A MEMOIR (VOLUME I), supra note 5, at 247.
45. Alfred L. Brophy, Curtis, Benjamin R., in THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 138, 139 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009);
Margaret M. Russell, Benjamin Robbins Curtis, in THE SUPREME COURT
JUSTICEs A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 125, 126 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1994).
46. AITKEN & AITKEN, supra note 29, at 71.
47. Robert C. Morris, Benjamin Robbins Curtis, in 5 AMERICAN NATION-
AL BIOGRAPHY 886 (John Arthur Garraty & Mark C. Carnes eds., 1999).
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slavery within the States was not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, but was reserved to the
States. If the President, as commander-in-chief of the
army and navy in time of war, may, by an executive
decree, exercise this power to abolish slavery in the
States, because he is of the opinion that he may thus 'best
subdue the enemy,' what other power, reserved to the
States or to the people, may not be exercised by the
President, for the same reason, that he is of the opinion
he may thus 'best subdue the enemy.'48
By the end of 1862, Curtis's respect for Lincoln had waned, and in
the 1864 election he supported Lincoln's Democratic opponent,
General George B. McClellan. 49
Curtis's criticism of the administration attracted the attention
of many who opposed the Emancipation Proclamation, including
Senator Orville Browning, a moderate Republican. When Chief
Justice Taney died on October 12, 1864, Browning contemplated
backing Curtis for the position but this thought was short lived, as
Browning was astute enough to know that Lincoln would never
appoint Curtis back to the bench.so Ultimately, however, the
notoriety that Curtis gained from his tenure with the high Court
and his powerful dissent in Dred Scott enhanced his legal career:
he returned to the Supreme Court only to argue twenty-two cases
before it.5 1
V. IMPEACHMENT
In March of 1868 Andrew Johnson, who had succeeded to the
Presidency upon the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, was facing
an imminent trial in the Senate on Articles of Impeachment
passed by the House. 52 The impeachment was primarily based on
President Johnson's dismissal of his disloyal Secretary of War,
Edwin Stanton, in violation of the Tenure of Office Act of 1867. 5
The heavily Republican Congress was angry that Johnson
48. B.R. CURTIS, EXECUTIVE POWER 10-34 (1862).
49. STREICHLER, supra note 30, at 151.
50. Morris, supra note 47, at 886.
51. AITKEN & AITKEN, supra note 29, at 71.
52. A MEMOIR (VOLUME I), supra note 5, at 407.
53. Id. at 405-07.
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tried to obstruct Reconstruction using vetoes. 54 Congress then
attempted to rein in his power with the Tenure of Office Act by
prohibiting the President from firing without permission of the
Senate any executive employee who was appointed during his
term and who was confirmed by the Senate.5 5
Johnson, with the strong asset of his loyal Cabinet members,
turned to Benjamin Curtis, Esq., of the Boston bar to be his lead
defense counsel.56 Johnson had never met Curtis but was
singularly impressed by his reputation as a judge and an
advocate.57  Curtis, as a matter of civic duty, accepted the
President's request and temporarily left his lucrative law practice
for this new appointment in Washington.5 8
The former justice took a room in Willard's Hotel upon his
arrival and proceeded to draft an answer on behalf of the
President to the Articles of Impeachment. 59 No other members of
the defense team were available for critical input, so Benjamin
Curtis invited his brother George Ticknor Curtis, a lawyer and a
noted scholar, to assist with the answer. 60
On March 30, 1868, President Johnson's Senate impeachment
trial began. 61 Benjamin Curtis knew that Johnson was impeached
because of political and personal hostility. 62 Furthermore, he was
acutely aware of the disadvantage he labored under because of the
Republican majority in the Senate. 63 His strategy was therefore
to lay out a calm, thorough, scholarly argument as if addressing
an appellate court, in the hope that some of the Republican
senators would temporarily abandon political and personal
hostilities and be compelled by the cold logic of his legal
argument. 64
Most of Benjamin Curtis's focus was on those Articles relating
54. Id. at 401.
55. Id. at 402-03.
56. Id. at 408.
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 409.
60. Id. at 409-10.
61. Id. at 410.
62. Id. at 410-11.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 410-11.
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to the Tenure of Office Act. 65 He argued that the Act as properly
construed did not apply to President Johnson's removal of
Secretary Stanton. Specifically, Stanton was appointed not by
President Johnson as required for violation of the Act but by
President Lincoln. 66  Furthermore, Stanton was not dismissed
during the term of the president who appointed him as required
for violation of the Act because Lincoln's term, as properly
construed, ended with his death.67 Curtis then stated, for the
sake of argument and without conceding the point, that whether
the Tenure of Office Act did ultimately apply to the Stanton
removal, as the Articles of Impeachment maintained, posed a
reasonable legal question. Curtis concluded it would not be an
impeachable "high misdemeanor," a willful disregard for the law,
for a President to execute his interpretation of an ambiguous law
and leave it to the Supreme Court to be the ultimate arbiter, as
Johnson had done. 68
Benjamin Curtis also made a very interesting constitutional
argument as to why the Tenure of Office Act did not apply to the
presidential firing of a member of his Cabinet. He ingeniously
resorted to precedent and originalism. He stated that when the
Framers' generation statutorily formed the War Department in
1789, they impliedly recognized, by not requiring Senate assent
for dismissal, that the Constitution under Article II inherently
granted the President the unilateral power to remove his War
Secretary. 69  Furthermore, this acknowledgement of the
President's constitutional power to unilaterally fire his Cabinet
members had been followed in political and legislative practice
without exception until the present aberration.7 0
After Benjamin Curtis's lead, other defense counsel followed,
but Curtis had successfully completed the intended job of
influencing enough of Johnson's political enemies by calm and
65. Id. at 411-12; BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS, 2 A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN
ROBBINS CURTIS, LL. D. WITH SOME OF His PROFESSIONAL AND MISCELLANEOUS
WRITINGS 343-422 (Benjamin R. Curtis ed., 1879) [hereinafter PROFESSIONAL
AND MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS (VOLUME Ii)].
66. PROFESSIONAL AND MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS (VOLUME II), supra note
65, at 351.
67. Id. at 347-49.
68. Id. at 365-66.
69. Id. at 359-60.
70. Id.
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meticulous legal argument. The President was acquitted with the
needed votes of seven Republican senators who bolted from their
party's line.7 1 Senator Fessenden apparently spoke for them later
when he stated "Judge Curtis gave us the law, and we followed
it." 72
VI. REPUTATION
As William D. Bader and Frank J. Williams demonstrated in
Unknown Justices of the United States Supreme Court, today's
legal scholars tend to ignore a justice's contemporary import in its
contemporary legal context and, instead, evaluate a justice based
on the current "political correctness" of his substantive holdings. 73
Often it takes merely one holding or action to elevate or bury a
71. A MEMOIR (VOLUME I), supra note 5, at 417 n.1.
72. See id.; STREICHLER, supra note 30, at 173.
73. BADER & WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 50-53; see generally WILLIAM D.
BADER & Roy M. MERSKEY, FIRST ONE HUNDRED EIGHT JUSTICES (2004).
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judge in today's scholarly-legal culture. In this respect, Carl
Swisher wrote of a reputational phenomenon pertinent to Curtis:
The favorable or unfavorable verdict which history
renders with respect to a member of the Supreme Court,
or perchance its complete neglect of him, may depend
upon his possession of, and his instinctive surrender to,
an intuitive perception of trends in the law which will
receive majority approval in the years to come. History,
in other words, rewards and punishes judges like men in
other walks of life not only for their brilliance, their
industry, and their integrity but for being right or
wrong-with right and wrong being determined by the
code of the age of the historian. Here, as in other fields
furthermore, a single act of 'sinfulness' may cloak with
obscurity a thick catalog of good deeds. 74
The single act that accounts for Curtis's popularity among our
politically correct legal culture is his dissenting opinion in Dred
Scott.75  Interestingly, this one act has eclipsed Curtis's
subsequent opposition to President Lincoln in favor of his less-
capable, conservative challenger, George McClellan, and his
opposition to the Emancipation Proclamation on legal grounds. 76
Although Benjamin Curtis personally opposed slavery, he was
always more concerned with maintaining the Union by placating
the South. For example, prior to his elevation to the Supreme
Court, he strongly supported obedience in Massachusetts to the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 and he maintained that the positive
law trumped the natural rights of slaves.7 7 Largely because of
Curtis's aforementioned views, President Millard Fillmore, who
was also solicitous of the Southern interests, appointed him to the
United States Supreme Court in 1851.78 This led the singularly
perceptive Charles Francis Adams to later observe, with some
indignation, that Curtis was viewed by "posterity as a champion of
74. Carl B. Swisher, The Judge in Historical Perspective, 24 IND. L.J.
381, 382 (1948).
75. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 564 (1857) (Curtis, J.
dissenting).
76. BADER & WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 58.
77. See A MEMOIR (VOLUME I), supra note 5, at 121-36.
78. Williams, supra note 1, at 279.
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principles, for his opposition to which he obtained his seat on the
bench." 9
A very brief, but interesting law review piece by Earl Maltz
and an equally short but provocative critique of the Maltz article
by R. Owen Williams are exceptional in posing skeptical views
about part of Justice Curtis's Dred Scott dissent.80 They suggest
that Curtis, rather than evidencing his reputed cold reason and
neutral legal principles, actually was motivated by anger and
political concerns in his treatment of the Missouri Compromise. 8 1
These lonely doubts, in a scholarly sea of approbation, deserve
further study.
Justice Benjamin Curtis was surely a great justice. Only five
years after his death, The New York Times commented that "there
is no exaggeration in the claim that [Curtis] was the greatest of
American Judges."82  And, in recognition of the power of his
dissent in Dred Scott, Massachusetts lawyer and politician
Benjamin F. Butler remarked, "[t]here is one contribution of
Judge Curtis ... which shall live long and be reckoned in the
judgments of Lord Mansfield on kindred subjects. The Dred Scott
opinion was the opening of a legal thought which has since been
embodied in the constitutions of the country."83  Despite his
conservative record and the limited scope of his opinion, Curtis is
largely remembered as its center in Dred Scott.84
79. Id. at 288 (citation omitted).
80. See Earl M. Maltz, The Last Angry Man: Benjamin Robbins Curtis
and the Dred Scott Case, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265 passim (2007); Williams,
supra note 1 passim.
81. Maltz, supra note 80, at 265; Williams, supra note 1, at 284-88.
82. New Publications, supra note 4.
83. Morris, supra note 47, at 887.
84. See A MEMOIR (VOLUME I), supra note 5, at 230-41.
